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Can the End of the Social Democratic
Trade Unions be the Beginning
of a New Kind of Social
Democratic Politics?
Charles F. Sabel 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The title of this essay is a provocation directed at the smaller and 
smaller group of people in the advanced capitalist democracies who 
are viscerally disturbed by the trade unions' self-evident disorientation 
and loss of influence on macroeconomic decisions and the reorganiza 
tion of firms. We know who we are. Despite our differences, we 
believe that persons who cannot exercise their autonomy in choosing 
their work and how to do it are diminished in an essential aspect of 
their personhood; and we believe that autonomy in these things can 
rarely be achieved by individuals acting in isolation. Because our ideas 
about how good society can be are bound up with these beliefs, we are 
always looking for signs that the strongest trade unions—those in the 
social democracies of Northern Europe—are successfully adjusting to 
the new conditions of international competition, and that their renewal 
can serve as a model and guide to the reconstruction of more embattled 
labor movements.
The first half of the provocation, hinted at in the title and spelled out 
in the body of the essay, is that this hope is unwarranted. I will not 
belabor the end of the industrial proletariat and its consequences for 
traditional forms of trade unionism. 1 1 argue instead that social demo 
cratic unions suppose in their organizational foundations a certain con 
cept of corporations, of relations among them, of careers within them, 
and of the boundary between them, "private" life, and the public sec 
tor. As actual conditions diverge more and more from this concept, the 
social democratic unions have more and more trouble addressing the 
difficulties that employees face in their workday lives, and less and less
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ability to make effective use of their powers to regulate production. 
The first part of the essay gives a compressed analysis of the way the 
corporations' successful adjustment to the crisis changes their organi 
zation in the relevant dimensions. The second part argues that social 
democratic unions will very likely, but not necessarily, encourage these 
transformations, yet are just as likely to be victims of these successes. 
The other half of the provocation in the title and the essay is the idea 
that to the extent social democratic unions do adjust to the new envi 
ronment, they perform activities associated more with political entities 
such as parties and social movements than with trade unions, although 
neither political parties nor social movements today define themselves 
as performing these particular tasks. The argument is a bit devious 
here, so it is only fair to tip my hand. Thus, the third part of the essay 
looks at effects of corporate reorganization on career patterns and the 
conception of work as a distinct sphere of activity; the fourth part inno 
cently deduces the features of a labor movement which can take 
account of these effects. The concluding section asks much less inno 
cently whether an organization with those features is a trade union in 
any reasonable understanding of that term at all. It contends that it is 
not a trade union but rather a new form of political activity. The reader 
is left wondering whether, if true, this finding is a good or a bad thing. 
So we end the excursion all in the same boat.
The Reorganization of the Firm
There is widespread agreement that firms respond to the current 
economic environment in one of two very general ways. The first is by 
cutting the production costs of standard goods. This can be done 
through automation of traditional production lines, subcontracting to 
low-wage producers, or some combination of both. Firms pursuing this 
strategy are always at the mercy of new low-cost entrants. Hence, they 
are permanently tempted to cut costs by reducing pay, worsening 
working conditions, introducing machines that can be operated by 
cheaper or less labor, or shifting production to low-wage areas. This is 
or soon becomes a sweating strategy, whether pursued by large firms 
or small. It is hard watching, among other things, the current massive
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layoffs of middle managers in U.S. firms that did for a time pursue this 
strategy, to see how anyone given a choice could prefer it in the long 
run to the alternative.
The second response is a strategy of permanent innovation. The aim 
is to respond to and stimulate demand for products or services that cor 
respond to consumers' wants more exactly than mass-produced goods. 
All products are regarded in this strategy as if they were capital goods, 
and valued according to the relation between their price and their abil 
ity to satisfy particular wants (the more favorable the price/perfor 
mance ratio the better), rather than according to their absolute price 
(the cheaper the better). 2
This second strategy depends on the reintegration of conception and 
execution in production. Marketing, design, and manufacturing must 
proceed concurrently, with those responsible for building the product 
helping to define what it will be in the first place and vice versa. Only 
in this way is it possible to cut development times in the measure 
required to get products to market when they are still in demand, and to 
reduce development costs to amounts that can be recovered through 
sale of short runs of affordably priced goods.
The reintegration of conception and execution has among its many 
other consequences three closely related effects which are of immedi 
ate significance for the organization of trade unions. The first is to raise 
the general level of skill required in production. Skill is the ability to 
perform complex tasks guided only by indicative instructions. The 
more superiors at all levels in the firm are pressed by constraints of 
time and money to instruct their subordinates to "use their judgment," 
"do their best," or simply "solve the problem," the more the subordi 
nates are called on to exercise their skills. It is impossible to apply 
instructions where there are none, and the further a firm progresses 
down the track of permanent innovation, the less likely it is that the 
production of any particular product will be codified in rules. Notice I 
am not claiming that all employees in firms following this strategy are 
always acquiring and using all the skills for which they might poten 
tially have a use. The claim is simply that whereas in the sweating 
strategy model the tendency is toward de-skilling, the tendency here is 
towards skill acquisition.3
The second consequence is to change the relation between firms, 
particularly large firms, and their subcontractors from one of domina-
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tion to one of collaboration.4 Just as the reintegration of conception and 
execution within firms leads to increased cooperation among different 
departments and across grades of hierarchy, so too it requires increased 
cooperation among the firms jointly producing a single final product. 
Subcontractors were, in effect, treated like semiskilled workers in the 
mass-production system: they executed a set of detailed blueprints pro 
vided by the customer, and secured orders by entering the lowest bid 
for a particular job. In a system of permanent innovation, where even 
the largest firms cannot master (because they cannot reliably antici 
pate) all the key technologies necessary to define and build rapidly 
changing products, subcontractors increasingly collaborate in the spec 
ification of the design and manufacturing setup. Asked to build a par 
ticular component or subassembly, for example, a subcontractor may 
propose modifications that reduce its cost of manufacture or improve 
its performance; asked to contribute expertise in the formulation of a 
plastic compound for an automobile company, for another example, a 
chemical firm may install and oversee the operation in the customer's 
plant of the machinery which shapes the new compound. This is not to 
claim that there are not disparities of power in relations between large 
firms and subcontractors in this system. Again the contrast is with the 
organization of mass production, particularly as it is denatured through 
sweating. In mass production, subcontractors were permanently, but 
not necessarily increasingly, subservient to their large customers. In 
sweating, a bad situation gets worse. In a system of permanent innova 
tion, the tendency is for it to get better, though plainly not for all sub 
contractors all at once.
The third consequence is the regionalization of production, by 
which I mean the geographic clustering of firms providing similar or 
complementary products or services to the same or related markets.5 
This third effect follows in large measure from the first two. Thus, the 
shorter the product life cycles, the riskier it is to hold inventories at any 
stage of the production process—hence the need for just-in-time logis 
tics, in which parts are produced and delivered as needed. Often (but 
by no means always) this means establishing production facilities in 
close proximity to the customer; and once established, these facilities 
attract other customers of the same sort. The shorter the product life 
cycle, moreover, the more likely it is that indispensable knowledge 
about production will become local knowledge—embedded in the
Social Democratic Trade Unions and Politics 141
half-articulated practices of persons who are in daily contact and who 
alone are in a position to grasp the implications of what they say and 
do. The more knowledge is commonly known to be of this type, the 
more firms will want to locate in the locale where it circulates. Finally, 
the more specialized firms or operating units of firms become, the 
more they are likely to depend for some of the services they need on 
the public or cooperative institutions of their locale. Training, quality 
control testing, and industrial medicine geared to the needs of a partic 
ular branch or sector are all examples of services that firms may want 
to have provided collectively; and, once again, the provision of such 
services by municipal authorities or a cooperative of firms or some 
combination of both attracts other firms in the same line of business. 
Thus, just as the integration of conception and execution blurs the hier 
archical boundaries within firms and the frontiers among them, so too 
it blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors.
This does not suggest that there has been or will be a night-to-day 
transformation. Because firms will want to cluster some of their key 
activities does not mean that all will be clustered. It may often be more 
advantageous to purchase subassemblies or even services from an 
established supplier than to invest in creating a local supplier. But the 
expectation is that the established subcontractor owes its success in 
part to its location in a prospering regional economy specialized in its 
business. Thus regionalization of production can go hand-in-hand with 
internationalization in the sense that firms reinforce their own core 
locales by linking them to similarly organized production systems else 
where.
To sidestep several debates that are, I think, out of place here, con 
sider two general qualifications regarding the model of the flexible, 
high-wage economy as a whole. First, the permanent-innovation econ 
omy is not necessarily an economy of small firms, although it is, com 
pared to the world of mass production, an economy of small 
production units or establishments. The model supposes that econo 
mies of scale—the bigger the plant, the cheaper the product—are less 
and less important. Otherwise the specialized product would be prohib 
itively more expensive than the standard ware. Hence the size of estab 
lishments should be (and according to much evidence is) constant or 
falling, always with respect to the size distribution of plants in particu 
lar industries in the period of mass production.6 But firms can also
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grow through exploiting economies of scope: the more diverse the cur 
rent production, the lower the incremental cost of a new product. By 
providing financial, marketing, or research and development services 
to establishments in different but related lines of work, a corporation 
can expand by enabling its constituent parts to specialize and diversify. 
There is, however, no reason to think that these services must be pro 
vided by a corporation with a controlling interest in the operating units, 
as opposed to a bank, a trading company, or a federation of the (inde 
pendently owned) operating units themselves. Even if it is a corpora 
tion which does the coordinating, furthermore, the control it exercises 
will be radically different from the centralized, bureaucratic control 
typically exercised by the headquarters of an American corporation in 
the past. Economies of scale are achieved through specialization of 
resources: ever more dedicated or specialized machines, ever more 
narrowly (semi) skilled workers, and ever more centralized structures. 
Economies of scope are achieved by "generalizing" resources or turn 
ing them to more and more diverse uses. This means more and more 
flexible equipment, more skilled and autonomous workers, and more 
supple organizations. As a glance at the management literature will 
reveal, managers themselves are extremely worried that the decentral 
ized organizations they are building will fly fissiparously apart 7 People 
in the labor movement are obviously and rightly concerned with the 
distribution of power in firms. But these days the size of a corporation 
is a less and less informative indicator of how authority is distributed 
within it.
The second qualification has been anticipated by the repeated obser 
vation that the shift to a flexible economy is not ah all-or-nothing prop 
osition. The permanently innovative, flexibly specialized, high-wage, 
high-skill economy is a limiting case. Some markets or parts of mar 
kets remain stable; some technologies, however plastic by historical 
standards, are more refractory than others. It is risky to try to shift from 
mass production to permanent innovation in a single leap, partly 
because it is unclear what the new model corporation really is (the 
point made just above), partly because building it, whatever it is, 
requires resources such as skilled labor which cannot be conjured into 
existence where they do not exist, and partly because firms cannot be 
sure that the unstable environment to which they are adjusting will not 
unexpectedly stabilize in a way that is more hospitable to a variant of
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mass-production techniques. For all these reasons, firms hedge their 
bets on rationalization, preferring hybrid strategies that combine ele 
ments of mass and flexible production in a fashion that allows the firms 
to move in the direction of whichever pole is more attractive. In an 
unstable world, all irreversible decisions are dangerous traps, including 
the decision to abandon the ability to respond efficiently to stability. 
The consequence of these hedging strategies is that almost every firm 
and every group of firms deviates from the limiting case of permanent 
innovation. But for present purposes, that is less consequential than the 
fact that they deviate as well from the traditional models of firm orga 
nization upon which the modern labor movement in both Western 
Europe and North America is premised. Corporate reorganization has a 
long way to go before the typical firm resembles the ideal type 
sketched here. But it has already demonstrated its competitive virtues 
with such clarity that it is necessary to rethink how the labor movement 
can encourage such benefit from these changes.
Some of the Things We Don't Know About
How the Labor Movement Can Encourage and Benefit
from Corporate Reorganization
Inconclusive as the model of the fully flexible corporation is, it is 
still more substantial than our knowledge of how such firms are or can 
be created in a particular economy, or of how labor can help create 
them and benefit from its efforts. There is little in the current debate on 
the future of the labor movement to challenge this assertion directly; 
but there is a great deal which presumes knowledge of these matters 
that I do not think is in hand. The purpose of this section, therefore, is 
to look critically at the two major and related arguments that connect 
the idea of labor's participation in economic restructuring to the reor 
ganization of the labor movement. Being clear(er) about what we don't 
know strikes me at the least as a good way to avoid a comforting, semi 
conscious reliance on familiar models and tropes in rethinking the 
tasks and structure of the labor movement. At the most, a clear view of 
the inappropriateness of new variants of old models to current condi 
tions focuses attention more precisely on what is truly novel in the cur-
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rent situation. For what it is worth, I have at one time or another argued 
both of the positions I criticize, and I am therefore at least as discom 
fited as anyone else by the criticism.
The first explanation of why some national economies, and collater 
ally some national labor movements, move more quickly and success 
fully in the direction of permanent innovation is simply that even as 
they industrialized, some economies never went very far down the path 
of mass production.8 Smaller, more differentiated markets and craft tra 
ditions of production reinforced each other so that, despite appearances 
to the contrary, the key elements of a flexible economy—skilled labor, 
flexible equipment, and the managerial know-how to constantly 
recombine them—were constantly reproduced. Conversely, these same 
traditions put barriers in the way of a forced-draft extension of mass- 
production models. When the new conditions of competition put a pre 
mium on flexibility, the West German, Austrian, Italian, Japanese, and 
Swedish economies did what came naturally: because the strategy of 
permanent innovation had many affinities with past practice whereas 
the sweating model looked like a radical break with tradition, they 
"chose" the former as the safer proposition. Where, as in the United 
States and Great Britain, less of the craft tradition had survived, the 
balance of potential costs and benefits was reversed, and the firms 
moved the other way, at least initially. The lesson for labor in this view 
is simply to revive and adjust to current conditions in craft traditions of 
organization wherever they have not survived and adjusted automati 
cally.
As a description of what makes for competitive success and failure, 
this type of account is unbeatable. But as an explanation, it is circular 
to the point of vacuity. Suppose we call all the rules and routines that 
regulate the distribution of authority in production economic institu 
tions. Then this view explains the existence in a particular economy of 
institutions favoring flexibility as the result of the historical presence in 
that society of institutions encouraging flexibility (or at least encourag 
ing the creation of institutions that encourage flexibility). If you think 
you can explain the sedative effects of opiates by noting their forma 
tive powers, you will find this kind of account satisfying; otherwise 
not.
To see the practical limits of this kind of tautologous formulation, it 
is only necessary to look a little more closely at the suggestion to
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revive craft principles in the organization of labor. Surely the craft idea 
of defining union jurisdiction according to the materials worked in 
each task—pipes to the pipe-fitters, bricks to the bricklayers—is an 
invitation to permanent jurisdictional disputes in an age when the con 
stant introduction of new materials makes it hazardous to guess what 
will be made of what. But the craft tradition of hiring halls, labor 
exchanges, and chambers of labor, where unions take substantial 
responsibility for training and allocating skilled labor, can arguably be 
seen as an intimation or (exceptionally, as in the case of Sweden) even 
a precursor of the kind of labor market institutions appropriate to a 
flexible economy. If firms increasingly subcontract design and produc 
tion of key subassemblies, why can't labor become a systems supplier 
of skilled labor? If the tendency is toward more collaborative relations 
between workers and managers within firms and between firms and 
their subcontractors, why is collaboration between the firm and the 
union as organizer of the local labor market less probable?
The point here is that to elaborate the case against "craft" jurisdic 
tion over jobs and for "craft" organization of the labor market is to 
specify which of the structuring principles of the craft economy might 
efficiently structure the emergent flexible system and why. To do that, 
however, is to begin to replace the flexibility-begets-flexibility argu 
ment with a model or proto-model of a flexible economy that shows 
just how specific institutions prove to be adapted to the current envi 
ronment
This is just what the second argument promises to do. I will call this 
the model of resurgent social democracy, because many of the institu 
tional features it identifies as favoring the transition to a flexible econ 
omy and reinforcing the labor movement through that transition are 
characteristic of the Northern European social democracies, particu 
larly those in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Indeed, 
the model is appealing in no small measure because it suggests that 
institutions indigenous not just to the West but to the left in the West 
could unexpectedly prove a politically palatable alternative to whole 
sale initiation of Japanese practices, which otherwise seems the humil 
iating price required to maintain economic competitiveness.
Like the more general institutional view, the model of resurgent 
social democracy identifies costs and benefits which move firms' 
choices away from sweating in the direction of the permanent-innova-
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tion strategy.9 The emphasis is on the costs imposed and benefits pro 
vided by the system of industrial relations broadly understood. The 
most important cost regards layoffs: a combination of legal and politi 
cal constraints obliges firms to negotiate expensive severance arrange 
ments whenever they seek to reduce the workforce. This makes 
management think twice and twice again before rationalizing, relocat 
ing, and subcontracting production work as prescribed in the sweating 
model. Labor, the familiar argument goes, is increasingly viewed as a 
fixed cost; and firms must consider carefully how to make efficient use 
of an asset of which they cannot dispose.
Here is where four key benefits of social democratic industrial rela 
tions come in. First, there is a system of plant-level dispute resolution 
based on considerations of equity and substance rather than precedent 
and procedure. Outcomes, in theory, are supposed to secure the firm's 
competitiveness while respecting the interests of employees, not to 
determine which employees are entitled to what given the language of 
the collective bargaining agreement and the common law of the plant. 
It would be easy to overstate the difference: workers in the social dem 
ocratic systems have plenty of legal and customary rights, and bargain 
ing in, say, the Anglo-American system is influenced by complex and 
encompassing ideas of equity.
But in the Anglo-American system, at least as it existed in the early 
1980s, the definition of rights was tied to the definition of jobs and 
seniority in ways that made reorganization at work a constant threat to 
established patterns of entitlement. 10 To accept changes in the defini 
tion and scope of one's job was to accept greater vulnerability to mana 
gerial discretion. In the social democratic system, standards are 
established to govern treatment of whole classes of employees—those 
above a certain age, the skilled, those with families, those requiring 
training—and so long as there are good prospects of satisfying these 
standards by any combination of, say, job transfers, compensatory 
training, and indemnifications, individuals do not have rights to partic 
ular places in the production system. Hence reorganization is not held 
hostage to adjudication of such rights.
The remaining features of the social democratic system as portrayed 
in this argument regulate relations between labor and capital outside 
the plant. The first and in many ways most important is simply labor's 
right to participate in the definition of administration of training pro-
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grams. 11 As demand for skill increases, labor's place in the institutional 
order becomes more central, the argument goes, because labor already 
occupies a central place in the training system; and this is true regard 
less of whether unions come to manage local labor markets on the hir 
ing hall model or in some other, unspecified way.
The second and third supra-plant features of the social democratic 
system are industrywide collective bargaining and the elaboration of 
framework labor regulations. Industrywide collective bargaining obvi 
ously establishes minimum wages and working conditions and guaran 
tees that flexibility at the plant and company level does not lead to 
company unionism in which workers and managers in each production 
unit try to advance their own (collective) interest, regardless of its con 
sequence for others in a similar situation. It also allows for experimen 
tation, industry-by-industry, with new ways of collectively establishing 
a fair distribution of the burdens of reorganization and adjusting the 
standards of equity applied at plant level to the new forms of work 
organization resulting from rationalization. Framework legislation, 
finally, coordinates public provision of training and social insurance 
with needs of firms and industries; it also protects and extends labor's 
right to gain, through some form of participation in managerial deci- 
sionmaking, the kind of information and veto powers necessary to 
make substantive regulation of industrial reorganization workable. 
Without the knowledge to judge what can reasonably be expected of a 
firm in a particular situation, and without the power to effectively 
obstruct solutions that violate its sense of equity, labor would have to 
seek protection through imposition of a much finer mesh of plant-level 
rules.
The net effect of the social democratic model is to make a choice of 
the sweating strategy of prohibiting expenses and the strategy of per 
manent innovation affordable and remunerative, if not painless. More 
over, the more rapidly the new strategy spreads, the better for the 
unions. The demand for skill draws unions more and more into the pro 
cess of reorganization itself, reinforcing their position with respect to 
the firms at the same time it refurbishes their appeal to their members. 
Indeed, if the process goes far enough, the unions will eventually come 
to exercise de facto rights of determination that they have not been able 
to obtain directly through legislation. Hence the resurgence of social 
democracy, and particularly social democratic industrial relations,
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which seemed threatened by the breakdown in the new world economy 
of tripartite or neocorporatist systems of wage bargaining that helped 
these countries reduce both inflation and unemployment in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. The lesson for economies that do not already have 
social democratic industrial relations systems as depicted in this model 
is clearly to build them, starting with the creation of training systems in 
which labor plays a central part.
This view certainly has more bite than the generic institutional 
explanation. The problem with it is not, I think, that it is vacuous but 
that, taken at face value, it is wrong. First, a strong labor movement in 
the sense of resurgent social democracy is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to encourage restructuring along the lines of the 
permanent-innovation strategy. Moreover, there is good evidence that 
trade unions and the labor movement more generally are unexpectedly 
being weakened by the very changes that they are directly and indi 
rectly encouraging, including the changes that favor use of more highly 
skilled labor.
Developments in countries as diverse as Switzerland, Japan, and 
France show that a social democratic labor movement is not a neces 
sary condition for flexible adjustments. All these countries have 
adopted flexible adjustment strategies, although the shift in this direc 
tion is more recent and less comprehensive in France. Swiss national 
unions are nonentities by almost any imaginable standard; there is 
debate about whether Japanese unions are company unions in the sense 
defined a moment ago or rather in the perjorative U.S. sense of yellow- 
dog organizations which betray their members to do the bidding of 
their masters in management. But there is no doubt that they are com 
pany unions in one sense or another. In France, less than 9 percent of 
the workforce is organized in unions. The question publicly posed for 
debate in that country is whether there can be unions without mem 
bers. 12
It is, to be sure, possible to explain how firms in each of the coun 
tries were moved, at least partly because of the particularities of their 
relation to labor, to decide in favor of the flexible strategy. Japanese 
firms have practices of granting long-term job security to their core 
workforce dating back to the 1920s. French unions have by law the 
right to participate in the decisionmaking of a great number of public 
entities with responsibility for monitoring and shaping the labor mar-
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ket. Swiss firms have long traditions of flexible production, and corre 
spondingly developed complex formal and informal systems of dispute 
resolution consistent with that strategy. 13 But the more complex and 
particular each of these explanations becomes, the closer it gets to the 
generic institutional argument in which flexibility begets flexibility. If 
you nodded in approval as that argument was dismissed a moment ago, 
you cannot use it as a makeweight to save the resurgent democratic 
model. The strength of that model is its parsimony; and elaborating it 
in response to counterexamples only weakens its foundation.
The same difficulties arise in the defense of the claim that the social 
democratic model of industrial relations is a sufficient condition for 
extension of the flexible economy. The argument suggests that the 
stronger the unions in the social democratic sense, the more likely that 
firms will perceive the costs of the sweating strategy as prohibitively 
high and the costs of flexible reorganization as attractively low. 14 But 
all change, even change ultimately for the better for almost everyone, 
imposes short-term costs. Suppose the unions become so strong that 
they can successfully not only oppose a switch to sweating, but also 
pursue a variant of the high-skill strategy in which the costs of transi 
tion are fairly shared. The result, as illustrated in the bankruptcy of the 
Austrian state-owned steel and metalworking firms that are the tradi 
tional fortress of the country's trade unions, is first stalemate, then 
catastrophe. 15 However much one is inclined to favor the expansion of 
union influence, this is, at best, too much of a good thing.
Here too, of course, it is possible to patch the argument by specify 
ing that it holds only within a particular range: when labor has suffi 
cient power to block sweating but not enough to be tempted to believe 
it is invulnerable to changes in the environment, and is able to defend 
the status quo indefinitely. But insofar as the specification looks for 
ward to the outcomes it aims to include and exclude, it again arouses 
suspicion of circularity. Just as troubling, the notion that more trade 
union power is not necessarily better undercuts the (to me) politically 
attractive suggestion that the model of resurgent social democracy 
offers an alternative to democratization of the workplace through legis 
lation. Surely employers will tend to suspect that there is a point at 
which an increase in union influence on decisionmaking begins to 
impede flexibility rather than encourage it. If advocates of the model of 
resurgent social democracy concede that such a point exists without
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being able to locate it precisely, managers will voice those suspicions 
sooner rather than later.
Labor, indeed, may not merely reap fewer benefits from restructur 
ing than the model suggests. It may find its organizational integrity 
undermined by the very process of economic reorganization it encour 
ages and from which members benefit as individuals. Whether this 
happens or not depends on the influence of reorganization on back 
ground conditions that the model, in its appealingly parsimonious 
forms, ignores.
Take as an example the organizational consequences for German 
unions of increasing demand for skill and the resulting extension of 
training programs. 16 Traditionally, youths went to work full time upon 
completion of their apprenticeships and were assimilated into the over 
lapping worlds of the shop floor and the union in the years that fol 
lowed. Many would subsequently continue their educations by 
attending classes. But even when they left the shop floor to become 
technicians or engineers, often with highly responsible jobs, they 
remained attached to the values which had formed them, and tolerant 
of if not loyal to the unions. In any case they defined themselves as dis 
tinct from university-trained managers, for whom the idea of a career 
was associated with the idea of progression up a formal hierarchy 
rather than with growing technical prowess.
Today this pattern and the distinctions on which it is based are disin 
tegrating. Young people spend a shorter and shorter time on the shop 
floor between completing their apprenticeships and continuing their 
educations. For the most ambitious and talented, more and more of the 
time spent on the shop floor at any stage in their careers is spent in spe 
cial project groups where teams of engineers, managers, technicians, 
and skilled workers perfect new products or install new production 
systems. The union is simply not a constitutive element of the training 
system on the shop floor as these new cohorts of skilled workers expe 
rience it. They are, to all appearances, not antiunion, but quite indiffer 
ent to its existence. Because the most active trade unionists and the 
bulk of union officials have, in Germany as elsewhere, been recruited 
from among the skilled workers, this indifference threatens the organi 
zation's ability to renew itself, and is clearly perceived by union lead 
ers as doing so.
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A second German example concerns the effects of subcontracting 
and the blurring of the boundaries among corporations more generally. 
As subcontractors take more and more responsibility for design and 
production work once done in-house, the plant or firm-level institu 
tions that defend employee interests are less and less able to even mon 
itor, let alone control, developments. The problems are aggravated 
when, as is frequently the case, the work is subcontracted to firms in 
industries other than the client's, and hence organized by different 
unions: unionized seamstresses upholstering seats in an automobile 
firm are members of the metalworkers union in Germany, but members 
of the textile and garment workers union if employed by a seat-making 
firm supplying the auto plant just-in-time from an adjacent facility. The 
engineers and skilled workers designing the microprocessor used in an 
advanced fuel-injection system are likely to be working for an elec 
tronics firm that is not organized by any union at all. Given that the 
social democratic model of substantive dispute resolution presumes the 
possibility of making a comprehensive assessment of the costs and 
benefits of various possible compromises, the fragmentation of control 
over the process of restructuring endangers the capacity to formulate 
and assess just the kinds of comprehensive bargains upon which the 
success of the substantive system depends.
A third example concerns the effects of changes in the boundaries 
and operation of the public sector. The reorganization of the economy 
on flexible lines changes the division of labor between the public and 
private sectors. The earlier discussion of the regionalization of produc 
tion and the increased public provision of services to industry indicated 
one aspect of this change. Another regards the growing barrier against 
the entry of the unskilled into the flexible economy. So long as much of 
the skill needed for work could be learned on the job, the state could 
provide unemployment insurance and other forms of social assistance 
independent of systematic job training and placement. The state 
assured citizens of a subsistence income, and the economy eventually 
provided jobs which allowed those who wanted to work their way into 
economic and social security the chance to do so. The more necessary 
it is to possess substantial generic skills to get any job, however, the 
more important it becomes to integrate the provision of social services 
and training into a package customized according to the needs of par 
ticular clients or client groups.
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But this recombination and customization of services often requires 
a profound reorganization of social welfare bureaucracies, including 
decentralization of authority to the local level and devolution of the 
responsibility for providing many services to community or other non 
profit groups with the kind of local knowledge on which the effective 
ness of the program depends. These pressures for reorganizing the 
bureaucracy and opening it to the outside world are further increased 
by the ambition—often inspired by the experience and model of the 
large firms and their reconstitution—to break monopolies in the provi 
sion of services ranging from medical care to garbage collection both 
as a spur to efficiency and as a protection against administrative arro 
gance. 17
The cumulative effect is that the fluidity of production relations, as 
indicated particularly by an increase in subcontracting, is becoming as 
typical of the public sector as it is of private industry. And as in private 
industry, the consequence for unions is an increase in jurisdictional dis 
putes whose occurrence is a sign of an increasingly poor fit between 
the organizational boundaries of the labor movement and the bound 
aries of the relevant units of economic and social welfare activity. Swe 
den is the most clamorous example of disruption which can result 
when public- and private-sector unions fight each other over the right 
to represent employees or classes of work which have passed in one 
form or another from public to private control. In Sweden, as else 
where, these conflicts resonate with and thus amplify the jurisdictional 
disputes provoked by reorganization within the private sector. 18
The aim in criticizing the model of resurgent social democracy is no 
more to suggest that labor's role in organizing the training system of 
shaping corporate decisions is irrelevant to its future than criticism of 
the generic institutional model is meant to demonstrate that economic 
adjustment is not influenced by institutional patterns.
Historical barriers to the extension of mass production and historical 
dispositions for flexible economic organization, including especially 
those associated with the social democratic system of industrial rela 
tions, help stack the deck against pursuit of the sweating strategy and 
for a program of permanent innovation. The difficulty with both the 
general and the particular institutional arguments is that in identifying 
important continuities between the emergent flexible economy and its 
antecedents, the former is assimilated into the latter in a way that
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obscures vital differences between them: differences, indeed, which 
affect the role in the new economy of just those institutions such as 
training that appeared to warrant the assimilation of new to old in the 
first place.
In the next two sections, I reverse the procedure. Rather than search 
ing for even a crude blueprint for the future in the past, I look only for 
those old building materials that can be used to erect the new system. 
Instead of treating the flexible economy as a distinctive elaboration of 
certain historical traditions in new circumstances, I try to outline a plan 
of construction by reflection on the novelty of the current situation as it 
has emerged in the preceding discussion.
The Localization of the Labor Market
Firms, we saw, are opening themselves to one another (through the 
transformation and extension of subcontracting relations) and to the 
society in which they are more and more embedded (through increas 
ing reliance on public or at least collective provision of training and 
other services as well as new forms of social insurance). This double 
opening is leading, I argued earlier, to the regionalization of produc 
tion: at the limit the fundamental unit of production is not the firm, but 
an ensemble of firms and public or community institutions in a particu 
lar locale.
Regionalization has two closely related effects on the organization 
of labor markets and hence on the boundary conditions that any labor 
movement operating in such markets would need to respect. First, the 
blurring of boundaries among firms that follows from the reintegration 
of conception and execution means that even as the demand for skill 
increases, individual jobs become less and less secure. When even the 
largest firms expect to turn to system suppliers to provide crucial 
expertise, but cannot predict when and for what sort of know-how they 
will do so, who at what level of the firm can be sure of his or her job? 
Where is the stable core of the economy? When high-flying employees 
can expect to be rotated from autonomous division to autonomous 
division or project group to project group to develop a sense of loyalty 
to the corporation as a whole, but the corporation cannot define itself
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as a unified entity except by pointing to the common experience of the 
high flyers, what sort of loyalty will the latter develop? Under these 
circumstances, to pursue a career does not mean to progress rung by 
rung up the bureaucratic ladder as envisaged in the concept of the 
closed labor markets central to the social democratic system of indus 
trial relations: many rungs are gone and the very structure on which the 
ladder rests may disappear. Nor does it mean, as in craft labor markets, 
to master a well-defined body of knowledge by moving from firm to 
firm in a predictable pattern: the definition of what knowledge is rele 
vant is constantly changing. Rather it means to assess constantly which 
of all the current or potentially acquired skills ought to be developed in 
the light of changing market conditions and one's unfolding self-con 
ception.
Second, the blurring of the boundary between the firm and society is 
paralleled for the individual in the blurring of the boundary between 
work and other crucial spheres of experience. The devolution of 
authority within organizations and the growing need for skill and team 
work require employees even in large corporations to exercise on the 
job the kind of autonomy and responsibility for the use of resources 
that in capitalist democracies have typically been regarded as the pre 
rogative of groups such as homeowners or the self-employed: those 
whose control over some form of capital entitled them to a correspond 
ing kind of economic sovereignty. "Private" or even "family" values 
such as self-reliance in complex situations are highly valued, perhaps 
even indispensable at work. Conversely, however, the less secure jobs 
become and the less meaningful the traditional ideas of a career, the 
more employees must rely on extra-firm associations established 
through the family, professional groups, churches, political parties, 
hobby groups, or social movements to learn what kinds of jobs are 
imperiled, what kinds expanding, and where to acquire the skills nec 
essary to compete for them. By definition, an information network that 
followed the contours of the firm would be of no help in these regards 
precisely because the information of value concerns possibilities 
beyond the corporate boundaries—the disintegration of which creates 
the insecurity in the first place. The more the social and the economic 
become fused through regionalization, the more the home invades the 
workplace and vice versa. Changes in gender relations, related but not 
reducible to changes in the organization of work, further mute the dis-
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tinction between the two by formalizing the division of labor in the 
household (if only by making it a matter for family discussion), and 
making family needs as the job prospects of each partner in the more 
and more numerous two-earner households a constraint on job 
choices. 19
Social democratic unions are coming to grief because they are not 
adjusting to these effects of reorganization, although they are in many 
ways the best positioned of all contemporary labor movements to make 
such adjustments. The unions (perhaps with the exception of those in 
Sweden) are losing their formative influence on the skilled workers 
because they are extraneous to the complex systems of post-appren 
ticeship training that define new kinds of careers and loyalties. Because 
their basic units of organization are the plant, the firm, and the branch, 
unions cannot regulate the increasing movement of work and workers 
across these boundaries. Because they presume a stable division of 
labor between the public and private sectors, and treat the public sector 
as if it were a firm in the traditional sense, unions are bewildered by 
efforts to redistribute responsibility between the state and civil society, 
efforts which often entail reorganization of the state itself.
Towards a New Model Union
To do better these unions will, in a sense, have to follow the lead of 
the firms: push responsibility for decisionmaking down to the local, 
operative level, and open the local unions and plant-level institutions 
in each area to one another and to the whole range of economically rel 
evant local actors from municipal authorities to environmental and 
social movements, and even political parties with whom they may 
have little or only hostile contact. 20 By inserting themselves into the 
regional economy at the points where the firms connect with one 
another and where they as a group join the local society, the unions can 
make themselves indispensable to management as systems suppliers of 
skilled labor and indispensable to their members as guides and advi 
sors in their passages from job to job and home to work and back. Con 
tinuing education for the skilled, extensive training for the semiskilled, 
extensive job counseling that bundles general social services and train-
156 Social Democratic Trade Unions and Politics
ing of both sorts in packages individuals and families can use are the 
first, indispensable steps to this end. If the social democratic unions 
can learn to do that much locally, it will be almost child's play to rede 
fine the advisory and tutelary role of the national union.
Unions in the United States seem to have an incomparable harder 
row to hoe. 21 Social democratic unions are victimized by the success of 
a broad movement towards flexible reorganization that they encourage. 
In the United States, the respective costs and benefits of the two adjust 
ment strategies are often indeterminate, and firms frequently oscillate 
between them. But whichever course firms choose, and perhaps most 
directly by their wavering, they do the unions harm.22 If the unions 
oppose cost-cutting strategies they are defending their members' privi 
leges; if they condone them, they are protecting their organizations at 
the members' expense. If they block attempts to increase flexibility, 
they are dinosaurs, unable to understand the motivations of the modern 
workforce and the exigencies of competition in world markets; but if 
they cooperate with strategies aimed at increasing productive flexibil 
ity, they make themselves and their members hostage to management's 
half-hearted and vacillating dedication to this course of action. Even 
the fear of a reversion to cost-cutting strategies— provoked perhaps by 
high-level corporate struggles far beyond the influence of plant-level 
or division management—is enough to reveal that labor's gradual 
abandonment of its traditional forms of self-defense make it vulnerable 
to incalculable risks. U.S. unions would, I suspect, love to have the 
problems of their social democratic counterparts; and that is perhaps 
one of the reasons they tend to discount the gravity of those difficulties 
if they take notice of them at all.
But it is easy to overlook the vulnerabilities of the strong and the 
strength of the vulnerability. The social democratic unions' position in 
the largest plants, the continuing allegiance of the middle-aged work 
force, and the unions' political influence make it easy for them to 
downplay the dangers of delayed adjustment, hard for the national cen 
ter to see why it should cede power to the local periphery, and harder 
still for any one powerful union to see why it should abandon its juris- 
dictional claims to the benefits of a rival. Conversely, the confusing 
fluidity of the American corporations and the debility of American 
labor mean that local unions may enjoy more freedom than their more 
closely regulated social democratic counterparts to establish them-
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selves as an indispensable component of an emergent regional econ 
omy should the occasion present itself for them to do so.
Such possibilities are, I think, much less remote than a simple sur 
vey of the disorganized and dispirited state of national—or, as their 
Canadian affiliations entitle them to say—international unions in the 
United States would suggest. At the plant level, many unions have 
become engaged during the last decade in various forms of worker par 
ticipation or employee involvement. In the many successful but scat 
tered programs of this type, blue- and white-collar workers take an 
active role in assessing the competitiveness of the plant and determin 
ing ways to improve it. 23 To do this they and the unions who represent 
them must have access to virtually all the information that manage 
ment considers in making its decisions. The result in the best cases is a 
system of substantive dispute resolution and de facto labor-manage 
ment codetermination which approximates the social democratic sys 
tems. But whereas the latter presumes rigid plant boundaries, many of 
the emergent plant-level systems in the United States grow out of 
cooperative efforts by managers and employees to establish which 
products the operating unit can, after the requisite reorganization, prof 
itably make, and which must be abandoned to other makers. Thus 
cooperation in this setting is from the first directed toward limiting the 
risks of an organizational vulnerability which, given the impossibility 
of fixing firm boundaries with any reliability, is broadly seen as a con 
stituent fact of corporate life. For the moment, these open-ended suc 
cess stories remain isolated: plants in the same corporation or region 
can have wildly different experiences in this regard, depending on the 
accidents of personality and timing; and national unions are either 
ignorant of local successes or too threatened by the popularity of the 
leaders they create to even debate their significance. But if one of the 
building blocks of a new labor movement is a local union rooted in the 
firm's decisionmaking yet not barricaded behind its formal boundaries, 
construction materials of this kind are being produced in the United 
States.
Similar considerations apply to training programs and the creation 
of subcontracting networks, although unions have been reticent to par 
ticipate in either of these foundational elements of the new regional 
economies. Here too local initiatives are indispensable. The pattern in 
training is for a group of firms, varying in size according to the nature
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of the local economy, to join with a community college or vocational 
training center to create a new kind of apprenticeship which blends tra 
ditional forms of vocational education with the relevant components of 
an undergraduate-level technical curriculum.24 New degree programs 
transform traditional machinery and other trades into paraprofessions. 
Often the project is initially funded with the help of state or federal 
monies. In this case too the fluidity of the situation is a potential advan 
tage. If apprenticeship were recreated in the United States now, and if 
the unions participated in its formation, it could be done in a way that 
gives labor a central place in a system of life-long training—a system 
that does not draw the line between initiation into a trade and continu 
ing education that vexes much of the social democratic labor move 
ment. But for the moment, U.S. unions are so absorbed with their day- 
to-day problems and the defense of the interests of their current mem 
bers that they are less likely to embrace these efforts to regenerate skill 
than to ignore or even to oppose them in favor of programs to retrain 
older, displaced workers.
The growing efforts to create subcontracting networks of diverse 
kinds also involve consortia of large and small firms, public—typically 
state—agencies, and educational institutions. Sometimes the initiative 
comes from large corporations, sometimes from trade associations, 
sometimes from ad hoc groups of small firms, sometimes from the 
public sector. Again the results are mixed. There are plenty of reliable 
successes strewn among the tales of disaster. But win or lose, the 
effects seldom succeed in overcoming the unions' preoccupation with 
other matters or fear that they lack the competence to participate 
knowledgeably in decisions for which they may later be held account 
able. Yet again it is clear that if the unions could vanquish their reti 
cence, they could be rebuilding themselves by building a structure 
indispensable to the local economy—and difficult to construct with the 
organizational tools of social democracy.
If your imagination stretches easily to comprehend these separate 
possibilities, then it will take only a slight additional effort to compre 
hend the possibility of a strategy that makes realization of each easier 
by connecting it to the others. Take the common case of a local union 
fighting for the innovation strategy in alliance with one faction of plant 
management against the rear-guard, cost-cutting methods of a second. 
Suppose next that the union and its allies participate in a training con-
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sortium that, among other things, undertakes to remedy the spot skill 
shortages that clouded the prospects of the permanent-innovation strat 
egy and provided a convenient argument to oppose it Suppose further 
that the union and its allies in management simultaneously participated 
in a consortium of large and small firms dedicated to improving sub 
contracting relations, and thus removing yet another potential obstacle 
to the flexible alternative. Suppose, finally, that a state government pro 
vides funds and advice to help the local union pursue all these tasks at 
once, and—welcome to America—you will have imagined just the 
program which the State of Michigan and a local of the United Auto 
mobile Workers in the auto parts sector pursued until the governor who 
supported the plan was unexpectedly defeated for reasons unrelated to 
his economic initiatives.25 Had this plan succeeded, or if any of the 
many, less formal ones that survive it prospers, one result would be to 
create local constituencies (other firms, educational institutions, public 
officials) who will take the union's side in its struggle against the cost- 
cutting strategy. If successes multiply, a second result would force 
unions to reverse the firms' strategy of using labor's concessions at one 
plant as justification for demands for give-backs at another. Instead, 
unions favoring the permanent-innovation strategy could begin whip- 
sawing recalcitrant management, using the examples of managers else 
where who participated to their benefit in cooperative strategies as a 
means of convincing their recalcitrant local interlocutors to do the 
same.
Does It Matter Whether
There Are New Model Unions?
Whether There Are Unions At All?
To us, the us addressed at the beginning of this essay, the answer to 
both these questions is self-evidently yes. People who are not much 
interested in labor these days are so sure that unions have no future that 
they seldom can be troubled to read essays alleging they might; those 
who believe unions do have a future or should are so desperate for 
some conformation of their hopes that they take the mere fact that 
essays appear on the topic as a sign that labor is more vigorous than it
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appears. But this essay about the future of the unions had indirectly 
raised the question whether we—and I am still talking about us— 
should care about the fate of the new model union, and indeed whether 
that organization is reasonably regarded as a union at all.
The answer to the first question is clearly connected to the unions' 
role in economic adjustment. If (almost) everyone should reasonably 
prefer the innovation strategy to the sweating strategy in the long run, 
and strong unions in the social democratic or new model sense encour 
age diffusion of the innovation strategy, then (almost) everyone should 
support either social democratic or new model unions.
But in the light of the foregoing discussion it is hard to extract much 
of a defense of new model unions from this kind of shaky syllogism. 
First, the argument supposes that unions play a critical role in deter 
mining the choice between strategies as though most of what managers 
did was decided by what unions did or how industrial relations are 
organized. Those things count—a lot. But we saw, first, that a social 
democratic industrial relations system is neither a necessary nor a suf 
ficient condition for the choice of the innovation strategy, and, second, 
that social democratic unions do not automatically become new model 
unions. On the contrary, they are more likely to be victims of the reor 
ganization they encourage.
The upshot is that the preceding discussion provides reasons for 
supporting several types of unionism if you care strongly about the 
outcome of economic adjustment, but no reasons for supporting unions 
more than, say, programs to encourage training or build subcontracting 
networks. Presumably more of all these things is better than less, and 
doing them concurrently or at least in a coordinated way is better than 
doing them disjointedly. But the model of resurgent social democracy 
is too ramshackle a theory of economic adjustment to suggest how 
scarce resources should be allocated even among this limited group of 
tasks.
The one strong conclusion which discussion of the model of resur 
gent social democracy does allow is, paradoxically, that whatever 
robust labor organizations emerge from and take root in the process of 
economic reorganization will not be trade unions in any traditional 
sense. Trade unions in the sense of social democracy or of American 
industrial unionism are concerned with the interests of employees at 
work, where work typically means a long-term association with a par-
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ticular occupation in a single firm. But if the foregoing analysis of the 
effects of reorganization is correct, the new model labor organizations 
will have to be concerned with addressing problems that cross the 
boundaries among firms and between work and other vital life activi 
ties. A labor organization that tries to distinguish its members' interests 
at work from their general interests in well-being could not, in this 
view, effectively represent their interests at all. 26
But why call an organization that represents some aspects of mem 
bers' general interests in well-being a trade union, or even a labor orga 
nization? I can think of little reason especially if that organization 
operates in association with social service agencies, schools, churches, 
and political parties. I say little reason rather than none at all because I 
imagine this organization might play a distinctive role in wage deter 
mination. But the more wages are set through individual negotiations 
between employees and firms on the one hand and more and more 
encompassing minimum wage or minimum social income legislation 
on the other, the less distinguishing a mark this will be. 27
No, the more natural but troubling way to think about organizations 
that represent their members' general interests in well-being is to 
regard them as engaged in politics. The characterization is natural 
because to defend its members' general interests in well-being an orga 
nization must articulate and advance a vision of life, including ideals 
of justice, views about the proper distribution of control over economic 
activity, and so on. If an organization that does these things is not a 
political organization, what other kind of reorganization might it be? 
But because the same kinds of everyday definitions that make it rea 
sonable to say that the new model union is not a union but a political 
organization obstruct efforts to say what kind of political organization 
it might be. Plainly unions are not parties in any traditional sense, 
because parties, we just saw, traditionally leave concerns about work to 
unions. More precisely, concern with work exhausts itself in concern 
for "the economy," which typically means macroeconomic decision- 
making, except insofar as such decisionmaking is in the hands of virtu 
ally self-governing institutions (as is often the case with, for example, 
central banks). Nor are these new model political organizations easily 
assimilated to social movements. Either these movements are con 
cerned with the situation of particular groups, in which case they aim 
to regulate workplace conditions only insofar as those conditions
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threaten their constituents' interests: for example, feminist groups fight 
sexism on the job and seniors' associations fight ageism. Or the social 
movements are concerned with what they regard as public interests 
such as a healthy environment or safe consumer products. In that case 
they aim to regulate production insofar as it is necessary to eliminate 
threats to these public interests: for example, by legislating reductions 
in pollution or creating incentives to or improving the safety of prod 
ucts by making firms strictly liable for harm caused by their wares. 
Thus social movements are not trying to regulate the relation between 
the economy and other spheres of life in general.28 On the contrary, it 
would be more accurate to say that the proliferation of these move 
ments is a response to the failure of the existing division of labor 
between parties and unions to define a form of regulation adapted to 
current circumstances; and that this response presumably makes the 
task of finding a general solution harder by creating more and more 
precise divisions among groups and interests that will eventually need 
to be reconciled both on and off the job through complex compro 
mises.
New model political organizations cannot, therefore, be social 
movements. If they are doing their jobs, they will be reducing the need 
for social movements, or rather the need for social movements to do 
some of the things they currently do in the way they do them. Certainly 
this will require collaboration between the new model entities and the 
social movements; but this does not suggest that one will absorb or 
come to approximate the other, any more than cooperation with politi 
cal parties suggests analogous outcomes.
Hence the disturbing provisioned conclusion: there is nothing in the 
logic of the current reorganization that warrants the assumption that we 
will have trade unions in the future. And if we have them they will be 
filling a political function that we can specify only in the sketchiest 
outline. But then it may well be that reflection on the void that would 
exist if these almost indefinable political entities did not take the place 
of trade unions is the beginning of another and more robust kind of 
argument for creating them.
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